Financial economics has posited a limited role for idiosyncratic noneconomic manager-specific influences, but the strategic management literature suggests such individual influences can affect corporate outcomes. We investigate whether individual managers play an economically significant role in their firms' voluntary financial disclosure choices. Tracking managers across firms over time, we find top executives exert unique and economically significant influence ͑manager-specific fixed effects͒ on their firms' voluntary disclosures, incremental to known economic determinants of disclosure, and firm-and time-specific effects. Managers' unique disclosure styles are associated with observable demographic characteristics of their personal backgrounds: managers promoted from finance, accounting, and legal career tracks, managers born before World War II, and those with military experience develop disclosure styles displaying certain conservative characteristics; and managers from finance and accounting and those with military experience favor more precise disclosure styles. These plausible associations confirm that our estimated manager-specific fixed effects capture systematic long-lived differences in managers' unique disclosure styles.
I. INTRODUCTION
W e investigate two related research questions: ͑1͒ Do top managers exhibit unique and economically significant individual-specific styles in voluntary corporate financial disclosure? ͑2͒ If so, are managers' unique experiences, as evidenced by observable demographic characteristics of their personal backgrounds, associated with cross-sectional differences in their overall disclosure styles?
Published theoretical and archival research in economics, finance, and accounting has largely posited a limited role for idiosyncratic noneconomic manager-specific influences in explaining cross-sectional differences in corporate choices such as voluntary disclosure.
1 Neoclassical economic theory assumes individuals are rational optimizers, and is often characterized as providing no role through which individuals could exert idiosyncratic influence on corporate outcomes ͑e.g., Weintraub 2002; Bertrand and Schoar 2003͒ . Agency theory proposes a less extreme, but still limited role through which individual managers could idiosyncratically influence corporate decisions. In this perspective, managers respond rationally to: ͑1͒ the firm's economic environment, and ͑2͒ the firm's monitoring mechanisms and managers' contractual incentives. As a result, research has typically focused on "representative" agents because individual managers can be induced to make similar choices through appropriate monitoring and contractual incentives. In this sense, neoclassical and agency theories allow little role for noneconomic manager-specific preferences to affect corporate outcomes. Two streams of research in management lead to a similar conclusion, reasoning that: ͑1͒ entrenched norms and cultures in large corporations constrain managers' choices ͑e.g., Lieberson and O'Connor 1972͒ , and ͑2͒ similarity in managers' backgrounds and experiences rising through the corporate ranks further limits heterogeneity ͑e.g., Hitt and Tyler 1991͒. In contrast, Hambrick and Mason's ͑1984͒ upper echelons theory predicts that managers are not effectively interchangeable. Their theory posits that idiosyncratic differences in managers' experiences are associated with differences in important personal values and cognitive styles such as honesty and tolerance of ambiguity, which can lead managers to make different choices, particularly in complex situations lacking clear and calculable solutions. Hambrick and Mason ͑1984͒ further argue that such preferences can in turn lead to different organizational outcomes. Thus, we investigate whether individual top managers play a significant incremental role in explaining cross-sectional variation in corporate voluntary disclosure choices, after controlling for known economic determinants of disclosure ͑and firm-specific effects͒. In other words, do managers exhibit economically significant individual-specific disclosure styles?
To address this question, we construct a panel data set that tracks top managers over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Given that firms are associated with both the key independent variable ͑man-agers͒ and the dependent variables ͑firms' disclosure choices are sticky over time͒, it is critical to control for firm-specific effects to avoid a correlated omitted variable problem, and to cleanly isolate manager-specific effects. By isolating manager-specific fixed effects on firms' disclosure characteristics, after controlling for known economic determinants of disclosure, firm fixed effects, and time period fixed effects, we can assess not only the existence, but also the magnitude, of individual managers' incremental effects on their firms' voluntary disclosures. We refer to this incremental manager-specific fixed effect as the manager's style.
Our results suggest top managers exert economically significant individual-specific influence over five aspects of management forecasts: forecast frequency, forecast precision, news conveyed by the forecast, and the bias in and accuracy of the forecast. We assess the economic significance of the manager-specific fixed effects along three dimensions. First, adding manager-specific fixed effects to the base models ͑that include the economic determinants, firm-specific effects, and time-period specific effects͒ increases explanatory power by 7.6 to 10.3 raw percentage points, translating to increases of 29.9 percent to over 400 percent relative to the base models' adjusted R 2 s. Second, manager-specific fixed effects are pervasive: between 38 percent and 51 percent of the individual manager-specific fixed effects are significant at the 10 percent level, much greater than expected by chance. Third, the distributions of managers' fixed effects reveal economically material differences. For example, replacing a manager at the 25th percentile of the distribution for forecast frequency with one at the 75th percentile more than triples the number of forecasts.
Having established that individual managers exhibit significant idiosyncratic disclosure styles-contrary to implicit assumptions of traditional financial economics research-our second question is: How do managers' personal experiences influence their own disclosure styles?
Upper echelons theory suggests that observable demographic characteristics of managers' backgrounds reflect key formative experiences that are associated with managers' unique cognitive styles and values. For example, this literature argues that managers' functional career tracks ͑e.g., marketing, accounting, legal͒ affect their preferences ͑e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984; Jensen and Zajac 2004͒ . We find that, on average, managers promoted from legal backgrounds tend to guide expectations down ͑reflecting greater sensitivity to litigation risk͒ and managers promoted from accounting and finance develop more precise disclosure styles that are conservative in underestimating upcoming earnings. Consistent with evidence that individuals who experienced the aftermath of the Great Depression and associated stock market crash are more conservative ͑e.g., Malmendier and Nagel 2008; Zemke et al. 2000͒ , we find that managers born before World War II are more conservative in being reluctant to forecast. We also find that military experience leads managers to develop styles favoring more precise forecasts that guide expectations down, consistent with lower tolerance for ambiguity, conservatism, and valuing honesty and integrity over self-interest ͑e.g., Soeters 1997; Goertzel and Hengst 1971; Franke 2001͒ . Finally, recent critics assert that M.B.A. programs overemphasize the pursuit of self-interest ͑e.g., Gintis and Khurana 2008͒. We find that M.B.A.s tend to guide expectations upward, but their forecasts are more accurate. Coupled with our evidence on the magnitude and pervasiveness of the manager-specific fixed effects, finding that managers' unique disclosure styles exhibit plausible associations with their distinctive permanent personal demographic characteristics confirms that we are capturing systematic long-lived differences in managers' unique styles ͑and not just random noise͒.
Our study makes several contributions. First, it responds to the Brochet et al. ͑2009, 32͒ suggestion that "research may explore whether disclosure policies … vary systematically with managerial style." We provide evidence that-in contrast to the implicit assumption in most prior financial economics research-this hitherto unexplored personal style dimension plays a significant incremental role in explaining cross-sectional differences in voluntary corporate financial disclosure, even after controlling for economic determinants of disclosure and firm-specific ͑and time-period-specific͒ fixed effects. Our evidence that not only CEOs, but also CFOs and General Counsels, exhibit distinct disclosure styles responds to Finkelstein and Hambrick's ͑1996͒ call for research on the influence of executives beyond the CEO level.
Our second contribution is a response to the Hirst et al. ͑2008, 316͒ call for a better understanding of the choices managers make once they decide to issue an earnings forecast ͑e.g., forecast precision͒, which Hirst et al. ͑2008͒ suggest is an important direction for both theory development and empirical research. Our study provides empirical evidence that managers develop unique and economically significant styles concerning detailed attributes of voluntary disclosure, and these styles reflect their personal demographic characteristics such as functional career track, age cohort, military experience, and education. Collectively, our evidence suggests that exploring the roles individual managers play in other financial reporting choices is a fruitful avenue for future research.
Third, we contribute more broadly to the nascent manager-effects literature. While Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒ show that managers matter in core strategic operational and financing decisions, the magnitude of managers' influence varies widely: effects are generally greater for highprofile strategic decisions like acquisitions, and smaller for operational financing decisions like cash holdings. Our evidence that managers not only matter, but matter significantly in seemingly second-order decisions such as the details of firms' voluntary disclosure decisions, extends the range of corporate decisions in which idiosyncratic manager styles are known to play an economically significant role. More importantly, our study contributes beyond existing research by integrating a broad set of literatures to provide conceptual bases for considering: ͑1͒ when and why managers might-or might not-matter, and ͑2͒ why and how characteristics of managers' personal backgrounds likely affect their idiosyncratic disclosure styles.
Finally, from a practical perspective, evidence that disclosures reflect manager-specific styles suggests that initiatives intended to remedy disclosure problems such as upward-biased forecasts ͑e.g., stock "hyping" observed by Lang and Lundholm ͓2000͔͒ may be more effective if they target the individual manager, as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does in holding managers responsible for the firm's financial reports.
II. CONTROVERSY OVER THE ROLE INDIVIDUAL MANAGERS PLAY IN CORPORATE DECISIONS Differing Perspectives on the Role Individual Top Managers Play in Corporate Decisions
Neoclassical economic theory is often characterized as allowing no role through which idiosyncratic differences among individuals can affect corporate outcomes ͑e.g., Weintraub 2002͒. For example, in "a neoclassical view of the firm … top managers are homogeneous and selfless inputs into the production process … ͓and͔ different managers are regarded as perfect substitutes for one another" ͑Bertrand and Schoar 2003, 1173͒. Agency theory allows individuals to differ in attributes such as effort aversion, but typically focuses on "representative" agents because monitoring and contractual incentives can induce individuals to make similar choices ͑e.g., Christensen and Feltham 2003͒ . Grounded in these traditions, archival research has typically abstracted from noneconomic manager-specific effects on corporate choices.
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Two streams of research in strategic management similarly conclude that managers are largely interchangeable. First, the external control perspective suggests that environmental and organizational constraints such as entrenched norms and cultures limit managers' choices ͑e.g., Lieberson and O'Connor 1972; Hannan and Freeman 1977͒ . Legitimacy constraints are particularly limiting, as managers conform to external expectations of rationality by imitating other managers, increasing homogeneity ͑e.g., Spender 1989; Hambrick et al. 1993; Chalmers and Godfrey 2004͒ . Second, the socialization and selection processes top managers experience rising through the corporate ranks further limits heterogeneity ͑Hitt and Tyler 1991; Hambrick 2007͒, with DiMaggio and Powell ͑1983, 152͒ asserting "such mechanisms create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition." For example, most CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms are white males with college degrees, many from elite institutions ͑Bhargava and Jespersen 1993; Datz 2000͒. A sig-nificant stream of empirical research in strategic management concludes that idiosyncratic influence of individual top managers is limited ͑e.g., Lieberson and O'Connor 1972; Salanick and Pfeffer 1977; Hitt and Tyler 1991͒. In Thomas et al. 1991; Tihanyi et al. 2000; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2006; Crossland and Hambrick 2007͒ . However, this research does not isolate manager effects after controlling for firm effects.
3 If unmodeled firm characteristics affect corporate choices, then by confounding managers' effects with firm effects, this literature likely overstates any "manager" effects. Archival research in finance and economics is just starting to explore whether individual managers impose idiosyncratic influence on corporate decisions. The seminal study in this genre, Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒, develops an innovative design that disentangles the manager effect from the firm effect by tracking managers across firms over time. They find that managers develop unique individual-specific styles in operational and financing decisions. Individual managers' incremental effects are generally greater for key strategic decisions like acquisitions, but smaller for operational financing policies such as cash holdings. If managers have any idiosyncratic influence on corporate decisions, then it is most likely to be on high-profile core strategic decisions where top managers are most interested and actively involved.
Ex ante, it is unclear whether managers would exert economically significant idiosyncratic influence on their firms' voluntary financial disclosure choices. Individual top managers' effects on voluntary disclosure hinge on: ͑1͒ the extent to which managers act as economic agents versus individuals with distinct communication styles, and ͑2͒ the discretion managers enjoy over the strategic choice ͑Hambrick 2007͒. Top managers who act primarily as economic agents are likely more interested in and involved in high-profile strategic operational and financing decisions ͑e.g., acquisitions, strategic marketing, production expansion͒, but are less interested in and less involved in seemingly secondary decisions about detailed attributes of management earnings forecasts. This suggests that top managers would have limited ͑if any͒ effect on the firm's voluntary disclosure choices. On the other hand, research in psychology concludes that humans develop long-lived, individual-specific communication styles ͑e.g., Pennebaker and King 1999͒. If top managers have distinct communication styles, such as valuing openness and transparency, then this would likely affect the characteristics of the firm's voluntary disclosures. With respect to discretion, top managers can in principle exercise discretion over management earnings forecasts, but their discretion is limited by the ex post verifiability of the disclosures and stickiness of firms' disclosure policies over time ͑Healy et al. 1999; Lang 1999͒. To summarize, certain theories and evidence suggest managers will have at most limited effect on their firms' voluntary disclosure choices, whereas other theories and evidence suggest the opposite. It is therefore an empirical question whether top managers exert economically significant individual-specific influence over their firms' voluntary disclosures. Thus, we investigate whether individual managers develop unique disclosure styles, paying special attention to the magnitude of any such manager-specific effects. To the extent that managers' backgrounds, socialization, and selection processes create similar experiences and induce similar values and cognitive styles, the demographic characteristics of their personal backgrounds are unlikely to explain any differences in their disclosure styles ͑e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hitt and Tyler 1991; . On the other hand, upper echelons theory suggests cross-sectional differences in managers' demographic characteristics, such as their functional career track, age, and education, differentially shape managers' values and cognitive bases, which in turn can affect their managerial styles ͑e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hitt and Tyler 1991͒ . We focus on the role of observable demographic characteristics of managers' backgrounds since upper echelons theory recommends that "An emphasis on background characteristics, rather than psychological dimensions, seems essential" ͑Hambrick and Mason 1984, 196 ; see also Hambrick 2007, 335͒. Whereas certain demographic background characteristics are observable and reliably measurable, top managers ͑especially of large corporations͒ are reluctant to submit to batteries of psychological tests, which are "too general and detached from executive issues to be useful for studying top managers" ͑Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, 46͒. That is, psychological test instruments intended for the general population are not tailored to identify finer psychological traits that might distinguish among successful professional executives. It is therefore not surprising that research using psychological measures has not found significant effects. For example, Sorter et al. ͑1964͒ and Faircloth and Ricchiute ͑1981͒ find that personality characteristics do not explain accountants' preferred reporting alternatives. In contrast, Faircloth and Ricchiute ͑1981, 53͒ find that objective personal demographic characteristics such as education do play a significant role, prompting them to recommend that "additional research should pay more attention to the effects of demographic information, which may in fact be more informative than many previously tested variables such as personality characteristics."
To guide our exploration of the relation between managers' demographic characteristics and their unique disclosure styles, we conducted a comprehensive review of a broad set of literatures ranging from strategic management, to career counseling, to sociology, to psychology, to military science, and to business education. We searched for theories or evidence suggesting how demo-4 A recent working paper by Brochet et al. ͑2009͒ investigates the effect of CEO or CFO turnover on the frequency and precision of management forecasts. When a new CFO is appointed, on average firms that provided frequent guidance before the turnover experience a temporary decrease in the quantity and precision of management earnings forecasts. When such firms appoint a new CEO, the decline in the frequency of management forecasts tends to be longer-lived ͑documented up to two years͒, but there is no effect on forecast precision. Thus, Brochet et al. ͑2009͒ document the effect of a managerial transition per se on the firm's disclosure policy. Our study is fundamentally different. Rather than focusing on the short-or medium-term effects of a shock resulting from a managerial transition per se, we focus on whether a given individual manager exhibits a persistent disclosure style measured over at least six years across multiple employers. Another working paper by Ge et al. ͑2009͒ explores the effects of CFOs on choices that affect mandatory financial reporting. They conclude that CFOs exert manager-specific fixed effects on GAAP earnings-related choices indicative of earnings management ͑e.g., abnormal accruals͒. They do not explore the effects of individual managers on voluntary management earnings forecasts, which is the focus of our study. graphic characteristics highlighted in Hambrick and Mason's ͑1984͒ upper echelons theory might plausibly be associated with cross-sectional differences in managers' unique disclosure styles. Our review suggests four demographic characteristics of managers' personal backgrounds-functional career track, age cohort, other career experience ͑specifically, military experience͒, and M.B.A. education-likely influence managers' unique disclosure styles.
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Functional Career Track
Hambrick and Mason's ͑1984, 200͒ upper echelons theory suggests a manager's primary functional career track affects his/her choices because "career experiences partially shape the lenses through which they view current strategic opportunities and problems." Socialized in their functional area's mindset, managers tend to converge on solutions to common business problems ͑Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, 93͒. Empirical research confirms that managers pursue strategies in line with their own functional expertise ͑e.g., Smith and White 1987; Thomas et al. 1991; Jensen and Zajac 2004͒ . Prior research characterizes individuals in technical financial functions as conventional, orderly, and inhibited ͑Holland 1973; 1997͒, suggesting they may adopt conservative disclosure styles. ͑We consider fewer forecasts, downward guidance, or guidance that undershoots upcoming earnings as various dimensions of a conservative disclosure style.͒ Managers from technical functions are also less tolerant of ambiguity ͑Holland 1966; 1997, 27͒, and Hambrick and Mason ͑1984͒ posit that managers from finance favor more budget detail and thoroughness, which suggests managers from finance or accounting may develop more precise communication styles. Executives with legal backgrounds are more sensitive to litigation risk, and so likely favor communication styles that do not promise too much. 
Age Cohort
Upper echelons theory suggests that the manager's age cohort can affect his/her values, cognitive styles, and thus his/her decisions ͑Hambrick and Mason 1984͒. Schuman and Scott ͑1989͒ show that the events an age cohort ͑individuals born in the same era͒ experiences during its youth affect later attitudes. Zemke et al. ͑2000͒ classify managers born before World War II as an important cohort, shaped by the lingering sacrifices and shortages of the Great Depression, the Dust Bowl that wiped out the Great Plains farms, and the war years, all of which inculcated conservative values. Emerging research in financial economics finds that cohorts who experienced lower stock returns during their investing lives are more conservative ͑Malmendier and Nagel 2008͒. Blanchard ͑1993͒ ascribes the decline in the equity risk premium to receding memories of the crash and the Great Depression, and Palsson ͑1996͒ finds that age is associated with greater risk aversion in portfolio holdings. Finally, Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒ find that managers from older birth cohorts choose lower levels of corporate expenditures, lower leverage, and larger cash holdings, consistent with conservatism. These arguments suggest executives born before World War II may develop more conservative communication styles, such as being less likely to issue forward-looking statements for fear such disclosures may prove inaccurate, ex post. 5 Upper echelons theory suggests that certain demographic characteristics affect managers' cognitive styles and values, but we had to search elsewhere to support how these characteristics might plausibly affect managers' disclosure styles. As a result of this search, we explored two additional demographic characteristics beyond upper echelons theory: gender and whether the manager is from the firm's founding family. Unfortunately, members of founding families of S&P 1500 firms do not move to similar positions at other S&P 1500 firms. Consistent with the literature documenting the homogeneity of managers' backgrounds, our sample includes only six female managers. 6 Bagley ͑2008, 379͒ argues that "legally astute" top managers make different choices because they "appreciate the importance of meeting society's expectations of appropriate behavior … and of treating stockholders fairly."
Military Experience
Upper echelons theory suggests that an executive's other career experiences can affect his/her decisions. We posit that military service is a different form of career experience that likely affects a manager's disclosure style. Military personnel tend to be less tolerant of ambiguity/uncertainty ͑e.g., Goertzel and Hengst 1971; Soeters 1997͒ , suggesting they may favor more precise communication styles. A common theme is "service before self" ͑Franke 2001͒, as the Army describes military values as "duty, selfless service, courage, integrity … and a sense of justice" ͑Headquar-ters, Department of the Army 1993, 1-2͒. Individuals choosing military service tend to be conservative ͑e.g., Goertzel and Hengst 1971; Franke 2001͒ . They are likely to agree that "honesty is the best policy," that "one should take action only when one is sure it is morally right," and are less likely to believe it is acceptable to "cut corners" ͑Franke 1998; 2001͒. They place relatively lower value on income and promotion opportunities ͑Soeters 1997͒. Such values suggest managers with military experience may favor styles that tend toward prompt and unbiased disclosure of unfavorable information ͑i.e., honesty about bad news͒.
M.B.A. Education
Upper echelons theory predicts managers holding M.B.A. degrees develop different styles than those without such educational backgrounds. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN The Existence and Magnitude of Individual Top Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Styles
Sample and Data
Firms' disclosure choices are sticky over time ͑Healy et al. 1999; Lang 1999͒, but as Hirst et al. ͑2008͒ point out, empirical models leave most of the cross-sectional variation in voluntary disclosure choices unexplained. This suggests that unidentified firm characteristics likely affect firms' disclosure choices. Because firms are associated with both the key independent variable ͑managers͒ and the dependent variables ͑disclosure choices͒, it is necessary to control for firmspecific fixed effects to avoid misattributing firm effects to managers.
We therefore use a research design with strong controls for firm effects. We adopt Bertrand and Schoar's ͑2003͒ longitudinal design that tracks managers over time, and requires managers to work for two or more employing firms, with at least three years at each employer so the manager has time to "imprint" his/her style. ͑If the manager works at only one firm, then his/her effect is confounded with the firm effect and it is not possible to cleanly separate the manager effect from the firm effect.͒ Figure 1 illustrates this design for two firms. For each firm, we control for firm-specific fixed effects measured over the entire sample period. To isolate the effect of an individual manager on disclosure-incremental to the effects of the firms-we measure the effect of Manager A across the two employing firms, after controlling for Firm 1's fixed effect, Firm 2's fixed effect, year fixed effects, and well-documented economic determinants of voluntary disclosure.
8 Manager A's style is measured by his/her fixed effect. Manager A's fixed effect reflects how Firm 1's forecast attributes in period 1 deviate from Firm 1's average forecast attributes, and how Firm 2's forecast attributes in period 2 deviate from Firm 2's average forecast attributes ͑after also abstracting from the effects of known economic determinants and year-specific effects͒. Thus, our estimated manager-specific fixed effects capture the incremental effects of a manager at multiple employers, after controlling for any firm-specific effects, over six ͑or more͒ years. This method also reduces concerns about correlated omitted variables, which to explain our results would have to vary over time and across firms in the same pattern as the movement over time and across firms of managers with unique disclosure styles.
From Execucomp, we record the five highest-paid managers for S&P 1500 firms. Our sample period starts in 1995 when First Call's Company Issued Guideline ͑CIG͒ database became a more complete source of management forecasts ͑Anilowski et al. 2007͒. 9 From 1995 to 2005, we identify 303 top managers that work for at least two different firms and stay employed by each firm for at least three years. We focus on managers whose last position is CEO, CFO, or General Counsel because these positions are more likely to influence voluntary disclosure. We match each firm-year with management forecasts reported in CIG.
Model and Variable Definitions
We investigate five attributes of management earnings forecasts: frequency, precision, news, direction of bias relative to actual earnings, and accuracy. The frequency of managers' forecasts ͑F_Freq͒ is the number of earnings-related forecasts the firm issues during the year ͑which is 0 if Manager A Manager C
Period 2 (at least 3 consecutive years)
Manager B Manager A Manager A's fixed effect is measured over Firms 1 and 2, after controlling for: (1) the fixed effect of Firm 1 (estimated over the entire sample period), (2) the fixed effect of Firm 2 (estimated over the entire sample period), (3) fixed effects for each year, and (4) all of the time-varying economic determinants of disclosure.
the firm issues no forecasts͒. 10 We code forecast precision ͑F_Precision͒ as 3, 2, 1, and 0, for point, range, open-ended, and general impression forecasts ͑e.g., Bamber and Cheon 1998; Baginski et al. 2002͒. 11 We measure forecast news as the difference between the forecast EPS ͑or midpoint of the range forecast͒ and the prevailing median analyst forecast, scaled by lagged stock price ͑F_Goodnews͒. We measure forecast bias ͑F_BiasUP͒ by comparing the management EPS forecast ͑using point forecasts and the midpoint of range forecasts͒ to ex post realized EPS.
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Forecasts that exceed actual EPS are coded as ϩ1 ͑i.e., optimistic forecasts͒, those that equal actual EPS are coded as 0, and those that fall short of actual EPS are coded as Ϫ1 ͑i.e., pessimistic forecasts͒.
13 Finally, we measure the inverse of forecast accuracy ͑F_AbsError͒ as the absolute value of the difference between the management EPS forecast ͑using point forecasts and the midpoint of range forecasts͒ and actual EPS, scaled by lagged stock price, following Ajinkya et al. ͑2005͒. Exhibit 1 summarizes our variable definitions.
To test whether individual managers play unique, individual-specific roles in firms' voluntary financial disclosure, we estimate the following models:
Our unit of analysis is a firm-year. Y it is the management forecast attribute for firm i in year t. When firms issue multiple forecasts in a year, we use firm-year averages for precision, news, bias, and accuracy.
14 The vector X controls for a comprehensive set of economic determinants of voluntary disclosure documented in prior literature, as summarized in Figure 2 and explained in the Appendix. Managers , our main variables of interest, are estimated coefficients for indicator variables corresponding to each individual manager, and thus represent the individual managers' fixed 10 F_Freq is skewed, but our inferences are robust if we redefine F_Freq as the natural log of 1 plus the number of forecasts. Our inferences are also robust when we conduct the analysis using a fixed effect count model ͑Poisson model͒, per Cameron and Trivedi ͑2005͒. 11 Our main analysis includes forecasts of all specificity levels. However, we obtain similar inferences using an alternative ͑inverse͒ measure of specificity where we code point forecasts as zero and range forecasts as the magnitude of the range, scaled by lagged share price. 12 We compare management earnings forecasts listed on First Call to actual earnings as reported by First Call to ensure consistency, following Ajinkya et al. ͑2005͒. 13 Our main analysis focuses on the direction of the bias, because the forecast error variable captures the distance of the forecast from ex post actual EPS. Nonetheless, we obtain similar inferences if we define F_BiasUP as the difference between the management forecast and ex post actual EPS, scaled by lagged share price. 14 We conduct our analysis at the firm-year level because our goal is to assess the extent to which individual managers affect overall firm disclosure policy. Untabulated sensitivity tests reveal that our results continue to hold if we use the last forecast issued in a year. Any dependence among multiple observations from the same firm does not affect our conclusions, because they continue to hold when we allow clustering of the error term at the firm level.
EXHIBIT 1 Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
F_Freq it ϭ number of management earnings forecasts firm i issued in year t; F_Precision it ϭ average precision of management earnings forecasts firm i issued in year t, where point forecasts are coded as 3, range forecasts are coded as 2, open-ended forecasts are coded as 1, and qualitative forecasts are coded as 0; F_Goodnews it ϭ average news conveyed by forecasts firm i issued in year t, measured as the difference between the forecast EPS ͑or midpoint of the range forecast͒ and the prevailing median analyst forecast, scaled by lagged stock price; F_BiasUP it ϭ average bias ͑relative to ex post actual earnings͒ in forecasts firm i issued in year t. a Forecasts that exceed actual earnings are coded as ϩ1, forecasts that equal actual earnings are coded as 0, and forecasts that fall short of actual earnings are coded as Ϫ1 ͑for range forecasts, we code this variable based on the midpoint of the range͒; and F_AbsError it ϭ inverse of forecast accuracy, measured as the average absolute error in the forecasts that firm i issued in year t, relative to ex post actual earnings. Specifically, we use the absolute value of the difference between the management forecast ͑using point forecasts and the midpoint of the range forecasts͒ and actual EPS, scaled by lagged stock price, multiplied by 100 to yield an error in percentage terms.
Control Variables
͉⌬EPS it ͉ ϭ absolute value of the change in firm i's earnings per share from year tϪ1 to t, deflated by stock price at the end of year tϪ1; Disp it ϭ standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of firm i's year t earnings, divided by the absolute value of the median forecast; EPS_UP it ϭ indicator variable coded as 1 if firm i's EPS in year t is greater than or equal to its EPS in year tϪ1, and 0 otherwise; Loss it ϭ indicator variable that equals l if firm i reports a loss in year t ͑Compustat item 172, net income͒, and 0 otherwise; R&D it ϭ firm i's expenditures on research and development in year t, scaled by its total assets; Mkt − Bk it ϭ market value of firm i's common equity divided by the book value of its common equity, at the end of year t; Outside_Dir it ϭ percentage of members of firm i's board of directors during year t, who are not also officers of the firm, from the Investor Responsibility Research Center ͑IRRC͒; %Inst it ϭ percentage of firm i's common stock held by institutions in year t, from Thomson Financial; Lsize it ϭ natural log of the market value of firm i's common equity in year t; #Analysts it ϭ number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for firm i in year t; Litigation it ϭ coded as 1 if the firm is a member of one of the following high-litigation-risk industries: SIC codes 2833-2836 ͑biotechnology͒, 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 ͑computers͒, 3600-3674 ͑electronics͒, 5200-5961 ͑retailing͒, and 8731-8734 ͑R&D service͒, and suffers a 20 percent or greater decrease in earnings; and 0 otherwise; ClassAction it ϭ 1 if the firm is involved in a securities lawsuit in year t, per the Stanford Security Class Action Clearinghouse; Restructuring it ϭ 1 if the firm was engaged in a restructuring during year t;
Restatement it ϭ 1 if the firm had a restatement in year t, per the General Accounting Office's Accounting Restatement database; Acquisition it ϭ 1 if the firm has a merger or acquisition in year t, per footnote 1 in the annual Compustat file; and F_Horizon it ϭ number of days between the forecast date and the end of the fiscal period of the forecasted earnings number. We scale this forecast horizon by 360 for annual forecasts or by 90 for quarterly forecasts, so the variable measures the proportion of the fiscal period remaining at the date firm i issues the forecast.
(continued on next page) effects. t controls for year-specific fixed effects, and ␥ i controls for firm-specific fixed effects.
15 15 We estimate models 1-5 using a firm fixed effect model ͑XTREG in STATA͒ that estimates coefficients for the economic determinants, manager indicator variables, and year indicator variables. The estimation eliminates the unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics in models 1-5 ͑i.e., the ␥ i ͒ by a within-transformation that demeans each variable for each firm ͑Wooldridge 2002, 267͒. An alternative is OLS estimation with explicit firm indicator variables. That approach generates the same coefficient estimates on the economic determinants ͑the vector X͒ and the manager ͑ Managers ͒ and time period effects ͑ t ͒, but it is computationally intensive, infeasible for models with thousands of firms ͑as is the case in one of our sensitivity tests͒, and it also generates higher adjusted R 2 . So our reported adjusted R 2 s are more conservative.
EXHIBIT 1 (continued) Additional Firm Characteristics
Mve it ϭ market value of firm i's common equity at the end of year t, in millions; Sales it ϭ sales revenue of firm i in year t, in millions; ROA it ϭ firm i's net income in year t divided by lagged total assets; Lev it ϭ firm i's long-term debt ͑Compustat item 9 ϩ item 34͒ divided by ͑long-term debt plus the book value of common equity ͑Compustat item 60͒͒; and Beta it ϭ firm i's equity beta for the fiscal period, calculated using daily equity returns and a single factor CAPM.
Manager Demographic Characteristics
Acct/Fin ϭ 1 if managers rise from accounting/finance backgrounds, and 0 otherwise; Legal ϭ 1 if managers rise from legal backgrounds, and 0 otherwise; PreWWII ϭ 1 if managers were born before World War II, and 0 otherwise;
Military ϭ 1 if managers have military experience, and 0 otherwise; and MBA ϭ 1 if managers hold an M.B.A. degree, and 0 otherwise.
a All actual EPS numbers are before extraordinary items. 
FIGURE 2 Detailed Model Specification
IV. RESULTS Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 compares our sample firm-years to the population with at least three consecutive years of data in Execucomp that also have at least one analyst following the firm, as reported by First Call. Our sample firms tend to be larger, because managers of larger firms are more likely to move to another firm in the S&P 1500 population covered by Execucomp. This biases against finding a manager-specific effect, because managerial discretion-and, hence, any manager-specific effect-declines with company size ͑Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Bertrand and Schoar 2003͒. Our sample firms are more levered, but similar in profitability and risk ͑beta͒.
On average, our sample firms issue 1.77 forecasts each year, slightly more than the population average of 1.48 ͑p ≤ 0.05͒. Our sample firms' forecasts are less biased ͑relative to ex post actual earnings͒ than those of the population ͑p ≤ 0.05͒. However, forecasts issued by our sample and the population exhibit similar precision, news ͑relative to prevailing analysts' forecasts͒, and accuracy. The average forecast gives a range of values, guides expectations downward, and is downwardbiased relative to actual earnings.
Turning to the economic determinants, our sample firms are slightly less likely to enjoy an increase in earnings during the forecast year, and have a larger proportion of outside directors, 16 We expect the accounting/finance and legal career tracks to be most relevant to voluntary earnings-related disclosure choice. Separate analysis of executives promoted from production and marketing tracks does not affect our inferences, nor were the coefficients on the marketing or production career track variables significant. 17 higher institutional ownership, and larger analyst following. Our sample firms also have slightly higher incidences of class action lawsuits, restructurings, and restatements, and their management earnings forecasts have somewhat longer horizon. However, the sample and population exhibit similar absolute changes in EPS, dispersion in analysts' forecasts, incidence of losses, R&D intensity, market-to-book ratios, litigation risk, and acquisition activity. In sum, our sample firms are somewhat larger than the population, and exhibit other differences associated with larger firms, but our sample does not differ on other fundamental economic characteristics such as risk ͑beta͒, return on assets, absolute changes in EPS, and market-to-book ratios. 
The Existence and Magnitude of Individual Top Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Styles
Main Results
The results of the manager fixed-effects analyses appear in Tables 2-6 . The primary inference is that top managers have statistically and economically significant fixed effects on their firms' voluntary disclosure choices. We discuss these results in more detail. a We report the results of five regressions after controlling for economic determinants, and year-and firm-specific fixed effects. We control for heteroscedasticity using White's standard errors. The adjusted R 2 is calculated based on the Within R 2 from XTREG, FE in STATA. Exhibit 1 defines the economic determinants. b The manager fixed effects are the estimated coefficients from Model 2 that controls for economic determinants as well as year-and firm-specific fixed effects in estimating the incremental manager fixed effects.
that the manager-specific fixed effects are jointly different from zero, after controlling for economic determinants as well as firm-and time-specific fixed effects ͑p Ͻ 0.001͒. We next assess the economic significance of these manager-specific fixed effects in three ways. We show: ͑1͒ the increase in adjusted R 2 from adding the manager fixed effects, both in terms of raw percentage points, and in percentage changes ͑i.e., the increase in adjusted R 2 as a percentage of the adjusted R 2 from Model 1͒, ͑2͒ that the proportion of statistically significant manager fixed effects is much higher than expected by chance, and ͑3͒ that the interquartile range indicates meaningful crosssectional differences in managers' disclosure styles.
First, even after controlling for known economic determinants of disclosure ͑as well as timeand firm-specific fixed effects͒, adding manager fixed effects to the base Model 1 significantly improves explanatory power. Adjusted R 2 increases from 33.5 percent in the base model to 43.5 percent, an increase of ten percentage points in absolute terms and 29.9 percent ͑10/33.5͒ in relative terms.
18 Models 3 to 5 show how managers in the CEO, CFO, and General Counsel positions contribute to the increase in explanatory power observed in Model 2.
19
The second chart in Table 2 displays the two additional indicators of the economic significance of the manager-specific fixed effects estimated in Model 2. Even after controlling for economic determinants, 51 percent of the individual manager-specific effects are significant at the 10 percent level, much higher than expected by chance. The interquartile range shows that replacing a manager at the 25th percentile with one at the 75th percentile increases the number of forecasts issued each year by 1.93, which is material given that the mean number of forecasts our sample firms issue each year is 1.77 ͑Table 1͒. Clearly, individual managers' unique fixed effects play an economically significant role in firms' forecasting frequency. Tables 3-6 show that the economic determinants explain much less of the cross-sectional variation in forecast precision, news, bias, and error ͑1.8 percent to 12.5 percent͒ than of forecast frequency ͑33.5 percent, Table 2͒ , consistent with the Hirst et al. ͑2008͒ observation that we know less about the attributes of management forecasts than we do about the decision to issue a forecast. For forecast precision, adding the manager-specific effects to the base Model 1 increases adjusted R 2 from 1.8 percent to 10.0 percent, an increase of 8.2 percentage points in absolute terms ͑or an increase of 456 percent in relative terms͒. Similarly, adding the manager-specific fixed effects to the forecast news, bias, and error models increases adjusted R 2 by 9.5, 7.6, and 10.3 percentage points ͑which translate to increases of 82 percent, 61 percent, and 82 percent in relative terms͒, relative to Model 1. The increases in adjusted R 2 observed in Models 3 to 5 suggest that CEOs' and CFOs' styles play a significant role in these forecast attributes, but the General Counsels' role is not economically meaningful except for the forecast error attribute.
The second chart in Tables 3-6 displays the distribution of manager-specific fixed effects estimated in Model 2. Between 38 percent and 46 percent of the individual manager fixed effects are significant at the 10 percent level, much higher than expected by chance. The interquartile ranges further support the materiality of the individual manager effects. Table 3 shows that replacing a manager at the 25th percentile with one at the 75th percentile increases average precision by 0.75, which is material relative to the unconditional mean of 1.97 ͑per Table 1͒ . Turning to 18 The increase in adjusted R 2 from adding manager-specific fixed effects compares favorably with the increase in adjusted R 2 from adding manager-specific fixed effects to models of other corporate decisions. For example, Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒ find that adding manager-specific fixed effects to models of investment and financial policies increases adjusted R 2 by an average of five percentage points across eight decisions. 19 Following Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒, our primary analyses are based on the manager's position at the last firm. When we require managers to retain the same job title at both Firm 1 and Firm 2 ͑i.e., CEO in both firms, CFO in both firms, or General Counsel in both firms͒, we still find that adding the manager-specific fixed effects increases the models' adjusted R 2 by an average of 8.3 raw percentage points across the five disclosure attributes. Table 4 , replacing a manager at the 25th percentile with one at the 75th shifts away from a tendency to issue forecasts to convey bad news, toward a tendency to issue forecasts to convey good news. Table 5 shows that replacing a manager in the 25th percentile with one in the 75th shifts from forecasts that undershoot earnings to forecasts that overshoot earnings. Finally, Table  6 shows that replacing a manager in the 25th percentile with one in the 75th increases average absolute forecast error by 0.91 percent of stock price, which is material relative to the sample mean absolute error of 0.58 percent per Table 1 . Taken together, Tables 2-6 show that manager-specific fixed effects play an economically significant incremental role in explaining forecast frequency as well as detailed forecast attributes such as precision, news conveyed by the forecast, bias relative to ex post actual EPS, and absolute Table 2 explain the statistical tests. b The manager fixed effects are the estimated coefficients from Model 2 that controls for economic determinants as well as year-and firm-specific fixed effects in estimating the incremental manager fixed effects.
forecast error, increasing adjusted R 2 by an average of 9.1 raw percentage points across the five forecast attributes. Between 38-51 percent of the individual managers' fixed effects are statistically significant. These effects are economically significant. For example, replacing a manager at the 25th percentile of forecast frequency with one at the 75th would more than triple the average number of forecasts. 20 20 Focusing on managers who serve multiple employers is more conservative than using a full panel that includes all managers ͑whether they move͒. By observing Manager B ͑in Figure 1͒ only at Firm 1 in period 2, the effects of any Table 2 explain the statistical tests. b The manager fixed effects are the estimated coefficients from Model 2 that controls for economic determinants as well as year-and firm-specific fixed effects in estimating the incremental manager fixed effects.
Originating Source of Impetus for Deviations from the Firm's Average Disclosure Policy
Tables 2-6 document the significant role individual managers' unique styles play in explaining deviations from the firm's average voluntary disclosure policies. The question remains, however, as to whether we can go further and shed light on the likely originating source of these time-varying unobserved firm characteristics in period 2 would be attributed to Manager B, overstating Manager B's fixed effect. Not surprisingly, when we repeat Models 1-5 using the full panel approach, including all firm-years with necessary Execucomp/First Call data whether managers moved, and regardless of the length of time they spent at the firm, the manager-specific fixed effects are, if anything, somewhat stronger. Table 2 explain the statistical tests. b The manager fixed effects are the estimated coefficients from Model 2 that controls for economic determinants as well as year-and firm-specific fixed effects in estimating the incremental manager fixed effects.
deviations. That is, do managers take the initiative to impose their styles on their firms, or do firms hire managers because the firm wants the manager to bring his/her unique disclosure style ͑which we refer to as the matching story͒? Under either scenario, managers influence the firm's disclosure choices. The only difference is the extent of the firm's role in proactively hiring a manager with a particular disclosure style. We argue that the impetus likely stems from top managers independently imposing their styles on the firm. First, Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒ conclude that the matching story does not explain the significant manager-specific fixed effects on fundamental strategic and operational choices such as preferences for internal versus external growth ͑e.g., capital investments and R&D versus acquisitions͒ and financial aggressiveness ͑e.g., dividend and capital structure policies͒. If firms do Table 2 explain the statistical tests. b The manager fixed effects are the estimated coefficients from Model 2 that controls for economic determinants as well as year-and firm-specific fixed effects in estimating the incremental manager fixed effects.
not proactively hire managers for specific styles in fundamental investment and operational decisions, it stretches credulity that firms proactively hire new top executives-particularly CEOslargely to change attributes of voluntary management earnings forecasts. Second, respondents to a recent National Investor Relations Institute ͑NIRI͒ survey say top managers do impose their unique disclosure styles on the firm. 21 Third, the matching story would require the firm's desired disclosure strategy to change over time in a pattern directly mirrored by changes in the types of managers the firm hires, and the primary causes of changes in desired disclosure strategy would have to be new drivers of voluntary disclosure that: ͑1͒ are not firm-specific characteristics ͑which are controlled by the firm-specific fixed effects͒, ͑2͒ are not year-specific effects ͑which are controlled by the year fixed effects͒, and ͑3͒ have not been identified by prior research, and thus are not included in our vector of economic determinants. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on our sample managers' demographic characteristics. Nearly half have an accounting or finance background, 8 percent have a legal background, and the remainder rose from general management ͑including production and marketing͒. Of the other demographic characteristics we measure, 16 percent of our sample managers were born before World War II, 10 percent have military experience, and 37 percent hold an M.B.A.. We also manually collected demographic characteristics of a random sample of 100 managers from the Execucomp/First Call population of firms used for comparison in Table 1 . Our sample managers are not significantly different from the random sample, except that we have a smaller proportion of older managers, which would bias against finding results on our age cohort variable ͑PreWWII͒. Panel B shows that managers rising from accounting and finance are less likely to be born before World War II, and more likely to hold M.B.A.s, consistent with a trend toward choosing professional administrators who run the company "by the numbers." Table 8 presents the results of estimating Model 6 that examines the association between managers' disclosure styles and their demographic characteristics. The base group impounded in the intercept is managers born after World War II who have neither military experience nor an M.B.A., and who rose from general management. Table 8 shows that managers with accounting or finance backgrounds develop disclosure styles that reflect lower tolerance of ambiguity ͑fewer but more specific forecasts, p ≤ 0.05͒ and that are conservative in tending to undershoot actual earnings ͑p ϭ 0.04͒. Managers with legal backgrounds favor disclosure styles that guide expectations down ͑p ϭ 0.09͒, reflecting sensitivity to litigation risk. Those born before World War II are conservative in that they tend to issue fewer forecasts ͑p Ͻ 0.01͒. Managers with military experience tend to develop disclosure styles that: ͑1͒ are more precise ͑p ϭ 0.04͒, reflecting lower tolerance of ambiguity, and ͑2͒ provide downward ͑not upward͒ guidance ͑p ϭ 0.02͒. Even though M.B.A.s' disclosure styles tend to guide expectations up ͑p ϭ 0.05͒, their disclosures are more accurate relative to ex post actual EPS ͑p ϭ 0.08͒.
Testing Whether Top Managers' Personal Demographic Characteristics are Associated with Their Unique Disclosure Styles
These associations between managers' demographic characteristics and their fixed effects are of interest in their own right. Finding plausible associations between manager-specific fixed effects estimated in the first stage and distinctive ͑permanent͒ characteristics of their own personal back-21 Among firms that discontinued guidance, the most popular response to "What would make you consider providing earnings guidance in the future?" was "change in management philosophy." Similarly, when asked "Where did the decision to consider discontinuing guidance come from?" 69 percent responded that it came from senior management. For companies that are currently providing guidance, but are considering discontinuing guidance, 63 percent of the respondents indicated that this is attributable to a "change in management philosophy" ͑NIRI 2007͒. 2 ͑2͒ ϭ 27.18, p Ͻ 0.001 * Indicates our sample differs significantly from the random sample managers ͑n ϭ 100͒ selected from the Execucomp/ First Call population on a two-sample test of differences in proportion ͑pϽ 0.05͒. a We collect managers' functional career track ͑i.e., employment history͒, age, military experience, and education from Marquis Who's Who Online, Hoover's, Mergent Online, Zoominfo.com, NNBD.com, Execucomp, and general Internet searches. We classify a manager's functional background into one of three categories: Accounting and Finance ͑Acct/ Fin͒, Legal, or General Management ͑including production, marketing, and strategy͒.
grounds also confirms these fixed effects are not simply random, but instead capture systematic long-lived cross-sectional differences in managers' unique disclosure styles. The explanatory power of these demographic characteristics is moderate, however. 22 Two econometric issues dampen the adjusted R 2 from OLS estimation. First, the dependent variables in Model 6 ͑i.e., manager-specific disclosure styles͒ are estimated parameters from the fixed-effect analysis, and so contain measurement error ͑although this measurement error should be smaller than the error that would occur in simpler designs that do not cleanly separate the manager effect from the firm effect͒. While OLS estimation still generates unbiased coefficients ͑Wooldridge 22 While moderate, our adjusted R 2 s compare favorably to those of the only other study ͑of which we are aware͒ that reports statistics on the explanatory power of models attempting to explain cross-sectional variation in managers' fixed effects ͑or styles͒ regarding other corporate decisions. In an independent and contemporaneously developed study, Dyreng et al. ͑2010, 1185͒ document manager-specific effects on corporate tax avoidance ͑measured based on effective tax rates͒. They conclude that "the results indicate that biographical information such as educational background and age does not explain much of the variation in tax avoidance across executives" because adjusted R 2 s from their regressions are negative. However, the authors go on to point out that "this finding does not suggest that executives have no effect on tax avoidance. Instead, these results are evidence that common, observable characteristics are not strongly associated with executives' propensities to reduce effective tax rates." Second, measurement error in the dependent variable can lead to outliers. We repeat our analysis using robust regression via least trimmed squares, which generates more stable results in the presence of outliers ͑Chen 2002; Zaman et al. 2001͒ . The last row of Table 8 shows that for four of our five forecast characteristics, the demographic variables' explanatory power is quite a bit higher using the robust regression estimation, with adjusted R 2 s ranging from 5 percent to 13 percent.
The simulation and robust regression results give a more appropriate sense of the economic significance of the demographic characteristics-the recommended starting point for exploring differences in managers' unique styles ͑Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Hambrick 2007, 335͒. Although we conducted a comprehensive review of a broad range of literatures, theory as to how demographic characteristics might be associated with unique managerial styles is in its infancy, and there are a limited number of observable ͑permanent͒ demographic characteristics that could plausibly affect disclosure. Managers' individual-specific disclosure styles undoubtedly result from their many ͑unobservable͒ experiences, psychological traits, and values, for which demographic characteristics such as functional career track, age cohort, military experience, and M.B.A. education provide a start, but are admittedly an incomplete and crude set of proxies.
Additional Analyses
Given the modest explanatory power of the demographic variables, we also explore whether two nondemographic factors explain managers' disclosure styles: managers' risk-taking behavior as revealed by their fixed effects on their firms' operating and financing decisions, and managers' fixed effects on their firms' operational efficiency. 24 We identify firm decisions and outcomes that might reflect their managers' risk-taking behavior: the frequency of acquisitions, investment in R&D and capital expenditure, cash holdings, and stock return volatility ͑Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bargeron et al. 2010͒ . We estimate managers' fixed effects on these decisions and outcomes using models similar to Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒. We add these risk-related manager-specific fixed effects ͑individually and in a composite index͒ to our original set of demographic variables in Model 6 that explains managers' overall disclosure styles. Our original inferences remain largely robust, and we find little evidence that these risk-related manager-specific fixed effects are associated with managers' styles in voluntary disclosure. 25 23 Even in a simulated world where X fully explains the true value of Y ͑so R 2 is 100 percent absent measurement error͒, adjusted R 2 plummets from 97 percent when the standard deviation of the error term in Y is 10 percent of the mean of Y, to just 11 percent when the standard deviation of the error term increases to 1.5 times the mean of Y. ͑Specifically, we randomly generate 200 observations by drawing X from a uniform distribution ͓1,100͔. Y is determined by X, Y ϭ 1ϩ1 ‫ء‬ X, so R 2 is 100 percent when we regress Y on X. We also randomly draw 200 values of a measurement error term, , from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation that is 10 percent of the mean of Y. We construct Y* ϭ Y ϩ and regress Y* on X. We repeat this regression 1,000 times ͑each time randomly drawing 200 values for the error term from the same distribution͒, constructing Y* based on each time, to get the mean adjusted R 2 and the mean coefficient estimates on X. We repeat this simulation for 15 trials, and in each trial we increase the standard deviation of the error term by 10 percent of the mean of Y until the standard deviation is 1.5 times the mean of Y.͒ 24 We are able to identify one demographic characteristic that likely primarily reflects risk aversion. Research in psychology and economics suggests that women tend to be more risk-averse, both in general ͑Byrnes et al. 1999; Harris et al. 2006͒ and in financial decisions ͑Powell and Ansic 1997; Watson and McNaughton 2007; Sapienza et al. 2009͒ . When we include gender in Model 6, all of the inferences on our original demographic variables remain robust, and we find that female managers tend to adopt disclosure styles that are less precise and underestimate upcoming earnings, consistent with females' greater risk aversion. However, recall that only six of our managers are female, so our findings on gender are necessarily tentative. 25 The only exception is that managers who are more risk-seeking in terms of engaging in more frequent acquisitions tend to forecast more frequently and tend to be more precise. When we include this fixed effect in our Model 6, the There are several explanations why this additional analysis did not yield new insights. First, to the extent our original demographic variables ͑partially͒ reflect the risk preferences of demographic groups ͑e.g., those who are older and those rising from accounting backgrounds tend to be more risk-averse͒, the incremental effect picked up by the new risk variables does not reflect the manager's total risk preference, but rather reflects how the manager's risk preference deviates from the average risk preferences of his/her demographic classifications. Second, unlike the reliably observable demographic variables, the new measures are estimated. Third, estimates of manager-specific fixed effects on the firm's operational and financing decisions may not reflect managers' true risk preferences because firms often provide compensation ͑e.g., equity-based pay͒ to encourage even risk-averse managers to take on risky operational and financing projects to maximize firm value ͑Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006͒ .
With respect to managers' operational efficiency, we estimate managers' fixed effects on asset turnover using a model similar to Bertrand and Schoar ͑2003͒. We find only weak evidence that managers' operational efficiency is associated with one aspect of their disclosure stylesmanagers who are associated with higher asset turnover tend to be less precise ͑p ϭ 0.09͒, while the inferences on our original demographic variables remain robust.
Recall that Tables 2-6 document the incremental effect of individual managers' total influences on cross-sectional variation in firms' voluntary disclosure choices in order to address our first research question: Do individual managers exert economically significant idiosyncratic noneconomic influence on their firms' voluntary disclosure choices? Our second research question follows upper echelons theory's recommendation to focus on how managers' demographic characteristics affect their unique styles, by investigating whether reliable, observable demographic characteristics of managers' personal backgrounds help explain cross-sectional variation in managers' own unique voluntary disclosure styles. Table 8 provides evidence of how managers' demographic characteristics affect their overall disclosure styles identified in Tables 2-6 .
We now provide ancillary analysis to address a different question-do the necessarily limited set of demographic characteristics for which we can find some conceptual support in the literature play an incremental role in directly explaining cross-sectional variation in firms' voluntary disclosure choices? We replace the manager-specific indicator variables used in Model 2 to estimate managers' total disclosure styles with the set of their demographic characteristics. Regressing firm-level disclosure choices directly on this admittedly limited set of demographic characteristics captures only the portion of the manager's total disclosure style that is associated with these demographic characteristics. Nonetheless, Table 9 shows that seven of the nine significant results reported in Table 8 continue to hold ͑accounting/finance backgrounds are no longer associated with less frequent but more downward-biased forecasts͒. 26 coefficient on Legal in the analysis of F_Goodnews just loses significance ͑p ϭ 0.14͒. 26 Table 9 does not provide evidence on managers' total impact on their firms' disclosure decisions; instead it only captures the effect of a set of observable demographic characteristics that is necessarily limited by the dearth of both extant theory and data availability. Thus, Table 9 captures only a small portion of managers' total idiosyncratic effects on cross-sectional variation in firms' voluntary disclosure choices. In contrast, the primary specifications in Tables 2-6 document the full effect of individual managers on firms' disclosure choices, and then Table 8 zooms in to explore how their demographic characteristics influence their own unique overall disclosure styles.
V. CONCLUSIONS Driven by conflicting views on whether managers impose any idiosyncratic influence on corporate decisions ͑e.g., Weintraub 2002; Feltham 2005; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hambrick and Mason 1984͒ , our study first examines whether top managers exert an economically significant influence on their firms' voluntary disclosure choices. We estimate the incremental effect an individual manager exerts on voluntary disclosure over two or more employing firms, after controlling for firm fixed effects, time-specific fixed effects, and economic determinants of voluntary disclosure identified in prior research. From the increase in adjusted R 2 , the proportion of significant manager fixed effects, and the interquartile range of the manager fixed effects, we conclude that managers exert economically significant individual-specific influence over five attributes of management earnings forecasts: the frequency of forecasts, forecast precision, news conveyed by the forecast, and the bias in and accuracy of the forecasts.
We then build on upper echelons theory ͑Hambrick and Mason 1984͒ and a broad set of literatures ranging from strategic management, to career counseling, to sociology, to psychology, to military science, and to business education to guide our exploration of how managers' functional career track, age cohort, military experience, and M.B.A. degree influence their unique disclosure styles. We find that disclosure styles of managers promoted from accounting and finance reflect elements of conservatism and distaste for ambiguity ͑fewer but more precise disclosures that tend to underestimate upcoming actual earnings͒. Disclosure styles of managers from legal backgrounds favor downward guidance, consistent with sensitivity to litigation risk. Managers born before World War II develop more conservative disclosure styles in terms of being more reluctant to forecast. Those with military experience favor more precise disclosure styles that tend *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
Two-tailed robust p-values adjusting for heteroscedasticity appear in parentheses. a All variables are defined in Exhibit 1. This analysis replaces the manager-specific indicator variables that we used in Model 2 to estimate managers' total disclosure styles ͑as reported in Tables 2 through 6͒ with the set of their demographic characteristics. Consequently, this analysis captures only the portion of the manager's total disclosure style that is associated with these demographic characteristics. For brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for the economic determinants, firm fixed effects, and time-period fixed effects.
toward prompt disclosure of unfavorable information. Finally, managers with M.B.A.s develop styles that tend to guide expectations upward, but are more accurate, consistent with M.B.A.s being better at forecasting or more sensitive to the adverse consequences of inaccurate forecasts. These plausible associations between the manager-specific fixed effects and distinctive permanent demographic characteristics of managers' own personal backgrounds confirm that the estimated manager-specific fixed effects reflect systematic long-lived differences in managers' disclosure styles, and not simply random error. From a practical perspective, evidence on the relation between managers' disclosure styles and their demographic characteristics can help users evaluate managers' disclosure choices. Knowing that older managers are less likely to issue forecasts, and that those with military experience are less likely to guide unless there is bad news, can help market participants interpret when silence might not indicate poor performance ͑contrary to theory that nondisclosure signals bad news ͓e.g., Verrecchia 2001, 141͔͒.
Our evidence that the largely unexplored personal style dimension plays a significant incremental role in explaining cross-sectional differences in corporate voluntary disclosure choices responds to the Brochet et al. ͑2009, 32͒ suggestion for research on whether firm disclosure policies vary systematically with managerial styles. Our evidence also helps address the puzzle noted by Hirst et al. ͑2008, 316͒: "Given that managers have substantially greater control over forecast characteristics … it is striking that the decisions managers make about such characteristics are comparatively less understood." Consistent with their conjecture that managers have more control over the detailed forecast characteristics, our evidence suggests that individual managers' idiosyncratic styles play a relatively more important incremental role in explaining detailed characteristics of the forecasts, such as precision. Our evidence also contributes in a broader fashion to the nascent manager-effects literature that has largely focused on manager-specific effects on high-profile strategic operating and financing decisions. Finding that managers also matter even in seemingly second-order decisions such as detailed voluntary disclosure choices extends the range of corporate decisions in which managers' idiosyncratic noneconomic styles are known to play an economically significant role. We also contribute by integrating a broad set of literatures to provide conceptual grounding as to why and when managers might ͑or might not͒ matter, and how various demographic characteristics of managers' personal backgrounds likely affect their idiosyncratic disclosure styles.
We believe future theoretical, archival, and experimental research incorporating richer roles for individuals' styles has great potential for increasing our understanding of how firms make financial reporting choices. For example, recent theory is beginning to allow idiosyncratic stylistic differences across individual top executives, such as managers' vision for the future of their companies, to affect corporate outcomes ͑e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner 2000; Van den Steen 2005͒. We hope that our evidence likewise spurs development of disclosure theories that incorporate richer roles for differences across managers' ͑noneconomic͒ characteristics.
Upper echelons theory suggests that managers' demographic characteristics are the appropriate starting point for exploring reasons for differences in individual managers' styles. Drawing on a comprehensive review of a broad set of literatures, we posit and find plausible associations between managers' demographic characteristics and their disclosure styles, although the explanatory power of the demographic characteristics is moderate. Consistent with upper echelon theory's emphasis on demographics, our attempts to identify nondemographic determinants of managers' styles met with limited success. Significant further improvements in explaining managers' styles may therefore require finer demographic data ͑relative to the types of demographic data that are currently publicly available͒, theoretically guided exploration of variables beyond demographic characteristics, and/or very different research methods. For example, surveys or behavioral research identifying cognitive traits and values that distinguish differences among the styles of highly successful professional managers may be fruitful avenues for future research.
APPENDIX ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
(the Vector X it ) To isolate the effects of individual managers, we control for the following comprehensive set of economic determinants that have been well documented in the prior disclosure literature. Prior research has established that firms are less likely to issue forecasts when earnings are more uncertain and harder to predict ͑e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Baginski et al. 2002; Ajinkya et al. 2005͒ . Similar to that prior research, we control for the absolute value of the change in EPS deflated by lagged stock price ͑|∆EPS|͒ and the dispersion in analysts' forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the median forecast ͑Disp͒.
27 Firms missing either their prior period earnings or zero profit benchmarks are less likely to issue forecasts ͑e.g., Miller 2002͒, so we control for the sign of the change in the firm's EPS: EPS_UP equals 1 if EPS is greater than or equal to the prior year's EPS. We also include an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports a loss ͑Loss͒.
Firms with higher proprietary information costs are less likely to issue public earnings forecasts, so we control for two measures of proprietary information costs: R&D, the firm's R&D expenditures scaled by total assets ͑Wang 2007͒, and Mkt-Bk, the firm's market-to-book ratio ͑Bamber and Cheon 1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005͒. Ajinkya et al. ͑2005͒ show that two measures of higher quality governance-proportion of outside directors and institutional ownership-are associated with a greater propensity to issue forecasts, so we control for the percentage of board members who are not also officers of the firm ͑Outside_Dir͒, and the percentage of the firm's common stock held by institutions ͑%Inst͒. To control for the fact that larger, more heavily followed firms issue more voluntary disclosures ͑e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Ajinkya et al. 2005͒ , we include the natural log of the market value of equity ͑LSize͒ and the number of analysts following the firm ͑#Analysts͒. Litigation risk is associated with voluntary disclosure. Following Wang ͑2007͒, we include an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry 28 and suffers an earnings decrease of 20 percent or more ͑Litigation͒. 29 Following Brochet et al. ͑2009͒, we control for lawsuits ͑ClassAction equals 1 if the firm is involved in a securities lawsuit in year t͒, restructurings ͑Restructuring equals 1 if the firm was engaged in a restructuring during year t͒, restatements ͑Restatement equals 1 if the firm had a restatement in year t͒, and acquisitions ͑Acquisition equals 1 if the firm has a merger or acquisition in year t͒.
As Hirst et al. ͑2008͒ note, much less is known about the determinants of detailed attributes of management forecasts. To be conservative, we include all of the above variables plus forecast horizon ͑e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1997; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Choi and Ziebart 2004͒ in the models explaining forecast precision, news conveyed by the forecast, and the bias and error in the 27 Following Baginski et al. ͑2002͒, we control for the difficulty of predicting current earnings, since this is most relevant to the decision whether to issue an earnings forecast in the current period. These measures also avoid survivorship bias induced by historical measures of earnings predictability. 28 Following Francis et al. ͑1994͒ and Wang ͑2007͒, we classify the following as high litigation risk industries: SIC codes 2833-2836 ͑biotechnology͒, 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 ͑computers͒, 3600-3674 ͑electronics͒, 5200-5961 ͑retailing͒, and 8731-8734 ͑R&D service͒. 29 Our model controls for over-time changes in the regulatory environment through the year-specific fixed effects. There is limited evidence that two additional phenomena may be associated with the propensity to issue management forecasts ͑although there is no evidence these phenomena are related to detailed attributes of management forecasts͒. Nagar et al. ͑2003͒ conclude that firms whose managers enjoy larger stock-based incentives issue more earnings forecasts ͑although Barth ͓2003͔ questions whether the results might reflect a correlated omitted variable͒. There is also conflicting evidence whether insider trading is associated with the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Noe ͑1999͒ finds no evidence that managers profit by trading before public disclosures, and Cheng and Lo ͑2006͒ find managers do not adjust their forecasting activity when selling shares ͑by far the most common type of insider trading͒, but they find some evidence that managers increase the number of bad news forecasts prior to share purchases. Untabulated results reveal that adding controls for stock-based incentives ͑i.e., the proportion of managers' compensation that is sensitive to share price, and managerial shareholdings͒, and total insider buying does not affect our inferences.
